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Power as well as Persuasion: 
Political Communication and Party Development. 
Dominic Wring 
 
Introduction. 
In the run-up to and during the 1997 general election political discourse was 
dominated by references to the supposed power and influence of the so-called 'spin 
doctors' and 'image makers'.  These terms are often, and quite erroneously, used 
interchangeably.  Those charged with 'doctoring' the 'spin' are primarily concerned 
with managing so-called 'free' media which is the coverage given politicians by print 
and broadcast journalists.  Working in tandem with this group, the 'image makers' 
are those marketing experts charged with interpreting popular opinion and 
developing a strategy to promote their particular party, candidate or leader by use of 
'paid' or 'controlled' communications such as advertising.   
 
By contrast with the 1997 campaign, the 1945 general election was largely devoid of 
talk about the work of the parties' respective media experts.  Nonetheless mass 
communication did play a role and both Conservative and Labour organisations 
retained the services of professional publicists.  Unlike 1997 however, much of the 
popular engagement with the electoral process in the 1945 campaign came at 
grassroots' level.  Reminiscing fifty years after the election that marked the beginning 
of his parliamentary career, former prime minister Jim Callaghan observed:  'I was 
not conscious of any interference from Transport House (party headquarters).  We 
fought our own election.  We were isolated'.1 
 
Since the war increased mediation of the democratic process combined with leading 
politicians' desire to capitalise on this development has transformed the nature of 
political communication.  Once marginal strategists responsible for managing the 
parties' central campaigns now enjoy a formidable and powerful role within their 
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respective hierarchies.  Much of the discussion about the consequences of mediated 
politics has rightly addressed the elusive issue as to the efficacy of professional 
techniques of persuasion.  Most debates have concentrated on these methods' 
relationship to popular opinion.2  Arguably there has also been an important effect 
at the level of the political elite.  Indeed this is not a new concern and is one shared 
by a range of scholars from Michels to Panebianco.3 
 
Party leaderships, eager to adapt and adopt new marketing and media techniques as 
a means of cultivating voters, have increasingly been using the same methods to 
manage and police the affairs of their own organisations.  Modern political 
communication is thus inherently concerned with intra-party power relations as well 
as mass persuasion.  This is nowhere more apparent than in the preparation and 
planning for an election.  As Richard Rose observes:  'The activities of campaigning 
are less concerned with the flow of influence from voters to candidates than they are 
with the flow within the political parties themselves'.4 
 
The opening section of this chapter is concerned with what might be termed 'the 
communication of politics'.  It will assess how election campaigning has evolved 
over the course of the Twentieth Century and show how changes have been made in 
response to the enfranchisement of a mass electorate and the challenge of a 
pervasive mass media.  Consideration will also be given to 'the politics of 
communication', that is the impact developments in campaigning have had on the 
internal organisation of political parties in Britain.  Discussion will focus on the ways 
in which strategic change has tended to result in the further centralisation of power 
within parliamentary leaderships and their agents. 
 
 
The Communication of Politics: the Transformed Campaign. 
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Each Nuffield study is an important social document that enables researchers to 
understand and assess how various political phenomena have evolved since the war.  
The books remain central to the understanding of how election campaigning 
developed during this period.  The 1945 general election, the subject of the first 
study, is perhaps more important as a landmark political event than as a watershed in 
communications' terms5.  This is because the campaign, held in the aftermath of 
such a major conflict, was in many ways highly atypical by Twentieth Century 
standards.  Similarly the elections of 1950, 1951 and 1955, called at short notice and 
fought by relatively poorly resourced parties, provided few opportunities for 
strategic innovation.6  Thus there is a need to look beyond 1945 and the immediate 
post-war era as the starting point for analysing how party campaigning has evolved 
over time.  Consequently changes in organisation both before and after this period 
need to be considered. 
 
Several commentators have discussed the transformation of party political 
communication.  A growing consensus appears to endorse the view that there are 
three principal periods of evolution.  The introductory chapter of this volume has 
labelled them the 'Morrisonian', 'Wilsonian' and 'Mandelsonian' eras.  Similarly 
Farrell7 and Norris8 have identified and discussed their own three stage 
developmental models of campaigning whilst Blumler and Kavanagh note the 
dawning of the ‘third age of political communication’.9  Adapting a framework 
popular in commercial marketing, Shama highlighted the parallels between an 
electoral and a business strategy.10  By using this approach together with terminology 
more relevant to political communication, it is possible to distinguish three key 
evolutionary periods of electioneering.  These are the eras of mass propaganda, 
media campaigning and political marketing.11  The essence of this model is that it 
places greatest emphasis on the nature of the interactions between an organisation 
and its audiences.  Critically it is this relationship, rather than any particular media or 
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technological developments, which is central to identifying how election 
campaigning has developed and changed over time. 
 
The era of mass propaganda. 
In Britain the era of mass propaganda began in earnest following the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1918.  Prior to then campaigns had tended to be dominated by 
what Ostrogorski called a 'trilogy of action' which consisted of the stump meeting, 
canvass and leafleting.12  During the general election year of 1910 the Conservatives 
managed to distribute 50 million items of literature, the Liberals 41 million and the 
infant Labour organisation a respectable 6 million.13  But a key event was the 
Representation of the People Act, implemented at the end of the Great War, which 
nearly trebled the electorate and gave some women and guaranteed working-class 
men the vote.  This landmark legislation, combined with the development of new 
mass media forms such as radio, meant that, in future, elections would be fought in 
a context where mass communications could and would play an important role. 
 
The mass propagandist approach, which was prevalent up to the end of the 1950s, 
can be characterised by the essentially unidirectional flow of information from 
politician to voter.  The party elites promoted their messages to the populace in the 
straightforward belief that maximum exposure for a message would heighten its 
appeal.  The era of propaganda did, however, witness some important 
experimentation in terms of political communication.  The inter-war period, in 
particular, saw the major parties first attempts to use radio in the elections of 1924 
onwards.14  Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin proved to be a particularly effective 
and popular broadcaster.  The potential presented by film, the visual precursor to 
television, also excited the Conservatives and, more belatedly, Labour.15 
 
Anticipating the arrival of public opinion polling, several party strategists began 
talking about the 'psychology of the electorate' during the 1920s.  In an influential 
 6
1922 article, leading intellectual and Labour strategist Sidney Webb mapped out 
what he termed 'stratified electioneering'.16  Webb outlined how parties might 
profitably promote themselves to target voters distinguishable by their 'colours', that 
is their social status, partisanship (or lack of it) or whatever.  These, he argued, made 
it possible to identify specific kinds of elector from the overall 'grey' of mass 
democracy.  Leading party official Harold Croft promoted Webb's idea in his 
popular Handbook of Party Organisation and several organisers sought to operationalise 
the concept.17 
 
The absence of formal market research did not prevent politicians from cultivating 
links with professionals working in the advertising industry.  The Conservatives' 
intention to use an agency in 1923 was postponed until 1929 when the party's 
Central Office hired the services of the Holford Bottomley company and another 
leading firm, SH Benson.18  Benson's, soon to gain fame for their legendary 
Guinness stout advertising, did not do so well in their first election.  The agency 
helped produce posters and other ephemera based on the chosen theme of 'Safety 
First'.  This campaign could not, however, prevent Labour from taking minority 
office for only the second time.  Nevertheless the relationship between Benson's and 
Central Office developed into an enduring one and lasted for the two further general 
elections held before the outbreak of war.   
 
Labour for its part was far more circumspect about using advertising agencies and a 
plan to retain one in 1935 was shelved.  As that election proved to be one of the 
most capital intensive of all time, political considerations rather than cost seem to 
have militated against the organisation's use of professional expertise.  Indeed, the 
party's pre-election 'Victory for Socialism' campaign raised a creditable £8000.  
Labour did nonetheless continue with its policy of commissioning highly effective 
and ingenious copy from design artists like Gerald Spenser Pryse and John 
Armstrong, creator of the famed 'Now Win the Peace' poster in 1945.  In 1924 a 
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highly attractive logo, the 'Liberty' badge, was approved.19  One senior party figure, 
Herbert Morrison, did however develop contacts in the marketing industries.  
Through his publicity work as leader of London County Council from 1934 onwards 
he managed to build up a formidable group of advisers.  Several of the professionals 
took time off from their agency work and became involved in preparations for 
Morrison's 1937 re-election campaign.20  Their expertise was used to good effect and 
Labour won a further term following a campaign which one trade journal even 
acclaimed as having 'set the standard' for commercial marketers. 
 
Labour’s reticence to embrace methods of mass communication can in part be 
explained by organisational factors such as poor finances and general inertia.  Unlike 
the Conservatives, the party contained a strong body of opinion critical of what were 
perceived to be irredeemably capitalist activities like marketing.  Commentators have 
sometimes overlooked these sentiments and assumed Labour’s opposition to 
professional communications’ methods stemmed from Luddite distrust of 
technology.  Rather this distrust is rooted in the early party’s doctrinal attachment to 
education as a means of emancipation.  This approach is associated with pioneering 
socialist propagandist Robert Blatchford, publisher of the Clarion journal.  He 
famously spoke of his desire to ‘Make Socialists’.  Consequently Labour tended to 
favour direct, didactic or ‘educationalist’ methods over what were perceived to be 
the more shallow, mass mediated forms of political communication.   
 
Those critical of Labour's educationalist stance during the inter-war period argued 
many lay people were invariably uninterested in politics yet needed to be won over if 
not converted by Labour.  Such a view found support from Graham Wallas, a 
Fabian thinker and London School of Economics academic.  In his book Human 
Nature in Politics, he questioned the classical democratic assumption that the 
electorate was a deliberative body of opinion capable of making informed choices 
and argued that most voters knew little of politics.21  As a consequence he argued 
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that the best way of communicating with them would be through advertising and 
other image conscious media.  Evidently some of his fellow Fabians took the 
message of Wallas' work seriously when they organised an 1936 Society conference 
on the theme 'Selling Socialism'.22  Indeed, as the example of London County 
Council’s Herbert Morrison indicates, a few people within the party were keen to 
embrace more image conscious approaches to political communication. 
 
The rise of media campaigning. 
In the couple of decades following the Second World War two particular changes in 
the media had a profound impact on political communication in Britain.  The 
growth of popular televison, most notably between the 1955 and 1959 elections, 
combined with the pioneering, investigative style of the new Independent Television 
News (ITN) organisation forced the parties to think about how they might exploit 
the opportunities mass visual broadcasting now afforded them.  ITN formed part of 
the independent network.23  This new service was funded from advertising revenues.  
The marketing industry rapidly expanded in size and influence, giving rise to what 
cultural commentators termed the 'consumer society'.  Political parties would not be 
immune to the new commercial ways of doing things. 
 
In their study of the 1959 Conservative victory, the Nuffield authors acknowledged 
the electoral importance of the new commercial media environment when they 
prominently highlighted Lord Woolton’s observation that 'the voter is also the 
consumer' at the head of an opening chapter.24  Indeed, it was this election which 
showcased the emergence of what can usefully be termed the 'media campaign'.  
Unlike the primarily unidirectional (party to voter) propagandist technique, this 
approach emphasised the need to solicit feedback through the use of public opinion 
research in order to better refine and redefine political presentation.  Greater 
attention was paid to the promotion of the party image, particularly through the new 
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televisual medium.  Professional marketing techniques and personnel began to 
become integral to the functioning of campaign organisations.   
 
Clearly influenced by his co-authoring of the 1959 Nuffield study and contribution 
to the following instalment, Richard Rose went on to complete Influencing Voters, his 
seminal study into the emergence of media campaigning in Britain.25  Central to this 
analysis was a more managerialist conception of electioneering.  Thus reference was 
made to various constituent parts of a campaign such as the competitors, client, 
environment, rules and strategy.  Scholars like Rose and former Conservative 
advertising strategist David Hennessy (ennobled as Lord Windlesham) joined David 
Butler and his fellow Nuffield authors in helping to foster the view that party 
political communication was a potentially rich and important arena for study and 
analysis.26 
 
The Conservatives' reinvention of themselves as a campaign organisation following 
their landslide defeat in 1945 was painstaking and incremental.  By 1948 the party's 
Central Office headquarters had established a Public Opinion Research Department 
devoted to the study of voter attitudes.27  With help from the Conservatives' newly 
appointed advertising agents Colman Prentis Varley (CPV), the PORD embarked on 
an assessment of voter attitudes which culminated in a major report called The 
Floating Vote.  The document, a wide ranging survey based assessment, identified 
several groups of potential supporters such as young people, women, Liberal 
supporters and weak partisans.  But it was the following decade, in the run up to the 
1959 election which provided a showcase for the new, professionalised methods of 
communications.  CPV played a central role in the long run-up to the campaign.  
Research and advertising expertise resulted in them producing the celebrated image 
of nuclear family emblazoned with the slogan 'Life Better Under the Conservatives: 
Don't Let Labour Ruin It'.28  Victory followed.  The electoral performance of the 
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Conservatives reinforced the perception that effective political communication could 
be a determinant of success.   
 
Initially sceptical about the value of the new media approach, many Labour 
strategists were weary of committing resources to an advertising process many 
viewed with hostility.  Nevertheless in the intervening years between the 1959 and 
1964 elections, the party reorganised its campaigning.29  A key feature of the changes 
was Labour's preparedness to engage and use marketing expertise in the guise of 
public relations, opinion research and advertising consultants.  The 1964 election 
and its outcome meant the return of the party to government.  The result once again 
helped propagate the view that good political communication could be an important 
element of this narrow victory, particularly in a tightly fought contest.   
 
In embracing the new, more media driven approach to campaigning it is perhaps 
surprising the party did so under the leadership of Harold Wilson.  Wilson had 
originally been an educationalist critic of colleagues who he accused of wanting to 
'refashion the Labour Party as the British version of the US Democratic Party'.30  He 
was by no means alone in adopting such a view.  Yet within a few years and, having 
been elected leader, Wilson proceeded to oversee an important transformation in his 
party's approach to political communication.  This electoral success brought support 
for the kind of changes he would have once attempted to thwart.  Yet many within 
the party hierarchy remained unhappy about the increasing political role and use of 
professional marketers.  At the 1978 Michael Foot mocked the Conservatives for 
their reliance on the Saatchis.  During the subsequent campaign Labour leader James 
Callaghan prided himself on declaring that he, unlike his principal opponent 
Margaret Thatcher, would not be sold like ‘Daz or Omo’.31   
 
The development of political marketing. 
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The 1966, 1970 and 1974 general elections all saw slight variations and modifications 
to political communication.  The 1979 campaign, however, was qualitatively 
different.  This change was partly brought about by the groundbreaking strategy of 
the winning party, the Conservatives.32  The notion of this as a watershed election 
was also reinforced by a number of environmental factors.  Most notable of these 
was the perception that there had been a marked rise in voter volatility as suggested 
by the apparent decline in support for the two major parties over the course of the 
previous decade.  The notion that electoral behaviour might increasingly come to 
resemble a commercial market in flux appeared to be becoming more than just an 
analogy.  Voters, it was argued, were becoming less fixed in their allegiances and 
more prone to shop around for the the most attractive party offering.33 
 
In tandem with the theoretical re-evaluation of voter behaviour came a marked 
intensification and interest in the use of marketing methods, a trend reinforced 
during the early 1980s with the rapid growth of the UK's service industries.  Central 
to this development was the growing importance and influence of modern 
managerialism in its various guises including the marketing communications sector 
of public relations, advertising and market research.  The combined impact of these 
methods and approaches has resulted in the commodification of all aspects of public 
life.  Politics has not been immune.  The mediation of the democratic process has 
also encouraged this trend because changes in broadcast and print journalism have 
afforded more reportage of key events and thereby enhanced the promotionalism of 
civic life and current affairs more generally. 
 
The Conservatives' successful campaigns in 1979 and 1983 are generally regarded as 
having ushered in the new era of marketing driven politics whereby opinion 
researchers and professional marketeers became increasingly central to strategic 
deliberations.  The partnership between Margaret Thatcher, the advertising agency 
owned by the two Saatchi brothers and their business colleague Tim Bell made for a 
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formidable team.  Thatcher, a keen student of political opinion polling, was regarded 
as a conviction politician.  The private regard she showed her marketing advisers was 
not publicly afforded her parliamentary colleagues.  She maintained a keen interest in 
the management of the party's communications and saw it as central element of her 
own appeal.34 
 
Scammell reconciles the apparent disparity between Thatcher the conviction 
politician and her advocacy of marketing by noting how she allowed research to 
influence the tenor and boundary of policy.  Critically, the Thatcherite project used 
opinion polling but also took advantage of several environmental opportunities.35  
Consequently economic circumstances, rising concern over crime, a supportive print 
media, a divided opposition and other factors were all exploited in a highly strategic 
manner.   
 
In contrast to the Conservatives the oppositon parties were uneasy with the new 
communications techniques.   The cost of using professional methods combined 
with ideological criticisms combined to limit the Liberals and Labour's adoption of 
marketing techniques and personnel.  Nevertheless in the early 1980s the newly 
founded Social Democratic Party did recoup its investment in direct mail by using it 
to successfully raise funds and recruit members.36  This approach soon became a key 
element of Conservative organisation.  Before the end of the decade Labour too was 
displaying its commitment to the potential power of good communications.  Hence 
during the 1987 general election, the party's conscious use of advertising and public 
relations showcased its belief in image management. 
 
The 1992 general election marked arguably a major turning point in modern 
campaign history.  This is because both of the major parties contending for office 
had now embraced political marketing as a strategic approach.  Labour, having 
repositioned itself to the right following its polling saturated Policy Review, fully 
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integrated advertising, market research and public relations into the headquarters' 
electoral organisation.  In the aftermath of the 1983 general election defeat Robin 
Cook had formed a contact 'breakfast' group of sympathetic professionals to help 
advise on campaign strategy.37  In 1986 the new Shadow Communications Agency 
(SCA) deepened the emryonic links between the party and marketing industries.  
The SCA functioned by allowing Labour supporters working in the business to offer 
their skills and expertise on a voluntary and anonymous basis.  Their charity 
combined with a lively and creditable performance in the 1987 general election 
promoted the importance of political marketing throughout the party.38  By 1992 
marketers such as the SCA co-ordinator Philip Gould and his colleague Deborah 
Mattinson enjoyed unprecedented positions of influence within the hierarchy 
surrounding leader Neil Kinnock.  Despite a fourth defeat and the disbanding of the 
SCA by Kinnock's successor John Smith, marketing personnel and ideas continued 
to play an important strategic role thereafter. 
 
The Conservatives once again employed the Saatchi agency in preparing for the 1992 
campaign.  Marketing personnel worked closely with the Central Office bureaucracy.  
Problems for them included the difficult economic situation and the potentially 
uncomfortable issue of Margaret Thatcher's resignation 18 months before in 
November 1990.  The personality of John Major, then regarded as a considerable 
asset, became central to his party's efforts.  Major's interest in sport and perceived 
qualities of affability and modesty were a key advertising theme along with his profile 
as a world statesman.39  The presidential approach was supported by a public 
relations gimmick, the soap box.  A response to the allegedly synthetic self-
promotion of his Labour opponent, several journalists saw an attempt by Major to 
play down the importance of so-called 'image makers'.40  Yet image management was 
precisely what the Prime Minister was engaged in.  The key marginal seats of Bolton 
and Luton Major visited in his soap box appearances suggested careful preparations 
had been made for what were opportunities to manufacture good television pictures 
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rather than to speak directly to voters.  The Conservative leader's efforts thus 
resonated with a mediated political tradition of the 'people's champion' stretching 
from the Hollywood film 'Mr Smith Goes to Washington' through to Boris Yeltsin's 
famous public denunciation of the 1991 Soviet coup from the top of a tank. 
 
The public goodwill towards the Conservatives evaporated not long into the 1992 
parliament.  In September that year the government was forced to withdraw the 
United Kingdom from membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.  
The ERM crisis, which cost the country billions of pounds, seriously undermined 
voter confidence in John Major and his party.  It never returned.  Following John 
Smith's sudden death in 1994 a marketing conscious Labour opposition elected 
Tony Blair to the leadership.  Blair had been the candidate most favoured by polls of 
the electorate.  The youthful leader subsequently rewrote his party's Clause 4 mission 
statement and rebranded the party 'New' Labour.  Blair kept up the already 
remorseless pressure on a beleaguered and unpopular government.  SCA veterans 
Philip Gould and Chris Powell together with the latter's BMP DDB Needham 
agency co-ordinated the party's marketing efforts.  Along with the rest of the 
bureaucracy, the campaign team relocated to Labour's new Westminster based 
headquarters housed within the Millbank building.  Here strategists co-ordinated 
polling and focus group research and discussed tactics.41  Those in charge were aided 
by a new rapid rebuttal service, the so-called Excalibur database, donated to the 
party by wealthy supporter Philip Jeffrey.  The efforts of Millbank together with a 
series of self-inflicted Conservative wounds combined to give Labour a landslide 
victory. 
 
 
The Politics of Communication: the Transformed Organisation. 
The increased professionalisation of political communication has been motivated by 
party strategists' desire to best promote their case to a mass electorate.  The 
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transformation of campaigning may have had some effect on voters but what is 
more readily demonstrable is the impact these changes have had on the 
organisations themselves.  With the 'marketisation' of electioneering over the course 
of the Century there have been important changes in the internal structures of the 
party organisation involved. 
 
Conservatives:  from gentleman to players. 
In 1910 Sir Malcolm Fraser became the first Conservative official to hold a publicity 
brief.  The following year saw the establishment of a party Press Bureau.42  
Enthusiastic support from most of the major privately owned national newspapers 
made the job straightforward.  Fraser's role was to keep sympathetic journalists 
supplied with useful information not least about the plans and activities of the 
Labour and Liberal opposition.  The links, even collusion, between Conservative 
Central Office and the Fleet Street print media were the subject of some controversy 
during the 1924 general election.  The first to be fought by an incumbent Labour 
administration, the campaign ended in the party's ejection from government.  This 
followed the publication of the so-called 'Zinoviev Letter' in the right-wing Daily 
Mail just before polling day.43  The paper's story, which alleged the Soviet Union 
strongly supported Labour's re-election, provoked outrage from a party fearful of 
guilt by association.  Subsequent revelations suggested the letter was a forgery 
concocted by a conspiracy involving Conservative officials, selected journalists and 
MI5 agents.  Whatever the origins, the incident hinted at the potential power and 
usefulness of the so-called 'Tory Press'. 
 
Conservative campaigning took a qualitative turn with the appointment of JCC 
Davidson to the key organisational portfolio of Chairman in the 1920s.44  A key 
feature of his tenure was the rejuvenation and use of a more aggressive publicity 
machine.  Davidson received help from the former secret service agent Joseph Ball.  
Ball prepared the party for the 1929 election and went on to be instrumental in 
 16
forming the National Publicity Bureau, an ambitious departure from the usual 
publicity machinery which took in the advice of various strategists.  Part of this 
venture involved the organisation of various communications and an ambitious 
programme of film propaganda that was popular with the public.  A Conservative 
Film Association headed by Sir Albert Clavering supported this incursion into visual 
political communication. 
 
Following the war a major rethink and reorganisation of the party took place.  These 
changes culminated in the party's adaption and popularisation of the media type 
campaign.  The young John Profumo began work with Central Office as 
broadcasting officer and visited the United States to observe the election campaign 
of 1952.45  In tandem with this the so-called 'Radio Doctor' Charles Hill popularised 
his party's use of radio with some PEBs.  In the late 1940s the party also recruited 
the services of the agency CPV and the PORD was set up as part of the 
reorganisation.  The publicity team at Central Office assiduously incorporated the 
advice of the marketing professionals while simultaneously working to senior figures 
in the parliamentary leadership.   
 
Many of the Conservatives who lobbied for the creation of ITV were keen to exploit 
the public relations opportunities afforded by the new medium in order to promote 
the party through televisual broadcasting.46  Crucial to these developments were key 
strategists like RA Butler MP, a keen supporter of the PORD, and Lords Poole and 
Woolton.  Having commercial backgrounds the two peers were especially keen to 
use established management practices in the organisation of campaigning.  Their 
confidence in such techniques appeared to be vindicated by the result of the 1959 
general election.  In preparing for this campaign a Liaison Committee had acted as 
both conduit for information and main decision-making forum for politicians, 
officials and consultants.47  Though the party continued to employ an advertising 
agency throughout the decade, more traditionally minded publicity officials were less 
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than convinced about more modern approaches to presentation.  The organisation 
was forced to examine its communications’ strategy following electoral setbacks in 
1964 and 1966. 
 
In 1970 something new was tried and the party retained a group of voluntary 
advisers.  It was an approach directly modelled on that devised by Richard Nixon's 
aides for his successful 1968 bid to become US president.  Ted Heath, the leader, 
was aided by party official Geoffrey Tucker together with marketing specialists and 
film makers including Barry Day and Bryan Forbes.48  They concentrated on 
promoting Heath’s image and also courting key sections of the public.  Women were 
identified as a particularly important target group.  In the ensuing election Heath and 
the Conservatives won re-election following a closely fought campaign which once 
again suggested professional political communication might have played some role 
in aiding the victors. 
 
Heath only enjoyed a single term as prime minister.  Like his patron, Tory Director 
General Michael Fraser’s nemesis proved to be Margaret Thatcher.  Fraser departed 
his post not long after Thatcher’s election as leader in 1975.  The vacancy created 
was not filled.  Instead, Thatcher sought to forge deeper organisational links with 
external advisers, most obviously the Saatchi and Saatchi brothers and their 
colleague Tim Bell.  Together with Central Office official Gordon Reece the three 
advisers became central in the planning of the Conservative campaign victories in 
1979 and 1983.  Eventually the party Chairmanship, a position in the gift of the 
leader, also went to people more in keeping with the Prime Minister's thinking such 
as Cecil Parkinson and Norman Tebbit. 
 
Initially the Saatchi agency's partnership with the Conservatives proved mutually 
beneficial.  Strain in the partnership developed following Tim Bell's unhappy 
departure from the company in the mid-1980s.  By the time of the 1987 election 
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Chairman Tebbit was working with the Saatchis whilst Thatcher was simultaneously 
being briefed by Bell and the advertising executive John Banks.  During the 
campaign a rogue opinion poll published a week before voting suggested Labour 
could win the election.  The news led to panic at Central Office on the so-called 
'Wobbly Thursday'.  Rival strategists argued with each other over the direction of the 
campaign.  The Conservatives went on to win but the serious row within the party 
further highlighted the prominent and powerful role now played by professional 
marketing and media advisers. 
 
The promotion of John Major to the Conservative leadership initially unified the 
party.  Victory in the 1992 election consolidated his position.  There was, however, a 
perception that the result had little to do with a negative, fractious campaign.  
Major's beleaguered administration suffered continual setbacks throughout the 1992 
parliament.  In the circumstances it was not perhaps surprising that he failed to 
effectively project a favourable image of himself or his government.  Opportunities 
for good communication were limited by a succession of pressing and difficult 
political problems.  The Saatchis continued to advise the party.  Yet the political 
problems the party faced in approaching the 1997 general election made effective 
planning and preparation difficult.  In the event the Conservatives' efforts lacked 
conviction.  Besides the Saatchi executives, politicians such as Deputy Prime 
Minister Michael Heseltine and Chairman Brian Mawhinney devised and authorised 
copy for advertising campaigns that did little to effectively promote the party.  The 
heavy electoral defeat that followed has led to a serious re-examination of party goals 
and organisation under a new leader, the former management consultant William 
Hague. 
 
Labour: from Committees to Cabals. 
Following its incarnation as the Labour Representation Committee at the turn of the 
Century, the Labour party formally fought its first general election six years later in 
 19
1906.  An ad hoc committee of leading figures led by Ramsay MacDonald oversaw 
the development of the campaign organisation.  Similar arrangements were made for 
the two elections held in 1910.  MacDonald worked with a small headquarters team 
based in the Victoria area of London.  Major changes came in 1917 with 
preparations for an overhaul of structures as part of the ongoing re-write of the 
constitution which culminated in the publication of a new statement of aims and 
values (the so-called 'Clause Four') the following year.  Herbert Tracey was 
appointed the first ever official to hold the publicity portfolio.  Former mill worker 
Tracey had trained and worked as a journalist.  Reflecting his spiritual beliefs, this 
Methodist lay preacher had been a correspondent with the Christian Commonwealth 
newspaper.  If former military and intelligence personnel dominated appointments 
to the Central Office publicity machine, those from religious backgrounds were 
prominent within the Labour operation.  This difference perhaps embodies 
something about the two parties' contrasting approaches to political communication 
during the inter-war period. 
 
William, the son of leading MP Arthur Henderson, held the publicity job after 
Tracey's departure in 1921.  He remained in charge for over twenty years and right 
up until the end of the Second World War.  Henderson's successor as head of 
publicity Arthur Bax maintained a fairly low profile.  Bax's replacement, the 
journalist and Gaitskell aide John Harris, proved to be quite different.  Harris, 
supported by a new deputy Percy Clark, facilitated a wholesale review of 
communications following his arrival at headquarters in 1962.49 The death of his 
patron and former employer Gaitskell did not hinder this work.  Indeed, the new 
leader Harold Wilson keenly supported developments.  Wilson, himself a noted 
student of organisation, famously chaired the committee whose 1955 report accused 
Labour of having 'a penny-farthing machine'.  On assuming the leadership in 1963 
he set about helping to remedy these apparent shortcomings by supporting what 
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amounted to the largest changes in campaigning structures since those introduced in 
the immediate aftermath of the Great War. 
 
Prior to 1962 Labour had made some attempts to modernise its approach to 
presentation.  During the 1940s and 1950s future ministers like Patrick Gordon-
Walker and Tony Benn had first come to prominence through their work developing 
the party's use of radio and television broadcasting opportunities.  Benn had hosted 
a celebrated series of innovative Party Election Broadcasts during the 1959 election 
campaign.50  After the campaign a group of party sympathisers commissioned 
market researcher Mark Abrams to undertake a survey of popular political attitudes.  
The influential work which emerged from this, the book Must Labour Lose?, helped 
raise awareness as to the potential benefits of polling.51 
 
By 1964 the party had completed what the Nuffield authors pointedly referred to as 
'The Modernisation of Labour'.52  A key feature of this process was the work of 
Harris, Clark and a new grouping of advisers drawn from commercial advertising, 
market research and public relations' backgrounds.  These included aides like David 
Kingsley and Michael Barnes whose original offers of help had been refused in 1959.  
Their work on the successful 'Let's Go' campaign helped return a Labour 
government and also reinforced the view that good communications were now 
becoming an integral part of electoral success. 
 
The Labour victory was followed by a more resounding success in the 1966 election.  
The campaign was organised by the same strategists.53  The formidable partnership 
forged between these strategists and the new prime minister led to some of them 
joining Wilson's controversial 'kitchen cabinet'.  The charge of presidentialism 
levelled at the Labour premier for his maintenance of such an entourage drew 
considerable criticism.  These attacks reached a crescendo following the 
government's loss of office in the 1970 election.54  This defeat, combined with the 
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ensuing debate over the Labour's programme, resulted in a more robust desire on 
the part of some to reassert their rights and powers to influence internal discussion 
within the party's federal structures, most obviously the Annual Conference. 
 
Organisational issues became the subject of intense factional debate within the party 
and this inevitably influenced the development of strategy.  Percy Clark, now 
Director of Publicity continued to work closely with the prime minister and key 
campaign advisers.  Wilson's retirement in 1976 marked a significant turning-point in 
the party's strategic development.  A committed student of public opinion polling, 
the prime minister had supported an ambitious market research programme from 
pollsters MORI prior to the two general 1974 elections.55  The busy policy agenda of 
Wilson's successor Jim Callaghan combined with the need to manage a precarious 
Commons' majority left comparatively little time for strategic matters.  He remained 
distant from a headquarters now presided over by General Secretary Ron Hayward, 
a tribune of the party's grassroots' left and an official weary of professional 
consultants.  Following the 1979 election defeat, marketing advisers such as Tim 
Delaney and Edward Booth-Clibborn expressed disatisfaction about their effective 
isolation from the central decision-making structures within the campaign 
organisation.56 
 
It is ironic that the most traumatic Labour campaign of modern times, in 1983, was 
also the first in which the party formally retained the services of an advertising 
agency.  That said the relative distance of the firm, Johnny Wright and Partners, 
from the party's albeit incoherent decision-making structures limited their 
effectiveness.57  Nor did Wright have continuous access to Labour’s own market 
research deliberations.  These organisational problems were closely linked to political 
factors and, in particular, ongoing factional divisions within the party.  These were in 
turn exacerbated by the then leader Michael Foot's personal preference for not 
playing a central role in the management of strategy.   
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Foot's enthusiasm for the practical rather than managerial side of campaigning 
created a vacuum.  Harold Wilson had been the link person at the centre of an 
uneasy alliance he had in effect created.  The situation had arisen because Labour's 
National Executive Committee system, traditionally responsible for campaigns, had 
been in effect supplemented by a network of strategic advisers.  The latter often 
worked with individuals, notably the leader, rather than to official structures.  
Though Foot did support the use of marketing expertise, his relatively low-key 
organisational role made effective decision-making difficult.  The problem was 
exacerbated by the lack of a core group of leader aides and party officials able to 
execute committee decisions and liase with outside advisers.  The resulting campaign 
was thus paralysed before it started.58 
 
The experience of the 1983 campaign defeat greatly influenced new leader Neil 
Kinnock.  He made the rejuvenation of campaign organisation a major priority.  His 
leadership would see the party's embrace of political marketing technique.  More 
profoundly for this social democratic organisation, managerialist thinking also began 
to inform its approach to electioneering.  Kinnock's reform of the party came in two 
major phases.  During the run-up to the 1987 campaign, the first stage saw the 
reintegration of professional expertise into party structures now overseen by a new 
Campaign Strategy Committee.59  To ensure decisions were implemented, the 
headquarters at Walworth Road were completely reorganised in 1985.  These 
changes amounted to the most complete overhaul since 1918 and were even greater 
than those implemented in the early 1960s.  A new four person Directorate was 
installed to assist the recently appointed General Secretary Larry Whitty.  The only 
outsider to join this team, Peter Mandelson, took over a publicity portfolio now re-
designated as Campaigns and Communications.60 
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Soon after Mandelson took charge he commissioned advertising consultant Philip 
Gould to investigate how the party’s political communications might be improved.  
Following a critical report, Gould set up the SCA to help develop campaigns.61  
Consisting of sympathetic professionals drawn from marketing, the Agency was 
central to party preparations for the 1987 general election.  As such it was little 
different to the informal advisory panels that had helped Morrison in the 1930s and 
Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s.  The SCA also played a critical strategic role 
following the 1987 defeat.  It had a central role in organising and presenting market 
research findings that proved to be central to Labour’s so-called Policy Review.  As 
its title suggests the Review was a wide-ranging process that cumulatively served to 
firmly reposition the party towards the right.  Partly inspired by his opposition to 
what he believed to be the increasing power of Labour’s ‘public relations people’, 
leading left-winger Tony Benn mounted an unsuccessful challenge for the leadership 
in 1988.  Though he anticipated the far reaching consequences of the reforms being 
proposed the scale of his defeat further underlined the problems facing dissenters 
within the party at the time. 
 
Following the Review, and the disappointment of the 1992 election defeat, Labour 
continued to use marketing and advertising expertise.  This was in spite of a barrage 
of criticism from many grassroots’ members and even Shadow Cabinet ministers 
such as John Prescott.  Following the defeat Prescott denounced the Shadow 
Agency as the ‘beautiful people’.  Initially key strategists who had worked so closely 
with Kinnock, notably Mandelson and Gould, were isolated under the new 
leadership of John Smith.  Smith, however, consolidated the modernisation process 
in his brief tenure as leader between 1992-94 by reforming the party's candidate 
selection procedures.  He, like successor Tony Blair, was adept at using the media to 
mobilise opinion within a greatly changed organisation.  During this period much 
was made of the party’s ‘spin’ doctors’ ability to manipulate debates.   
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The election of Tony Blair as leader in 1994 and Labour’s subsequent victory in 
1997 did little to diminish the considerable speculation as to these actors’ supposed 
power to subvert and control every facet of the organisation and its business.  In a 
much reported 1996 interview, Shadow Cabinet member Clare Short made public 
her disquiet about the supposed power of the ‘people in the dark’ advising Blair.  
Short's comments reflect a widespread concern both within and without her party 
that those charged with managing a politician's media relations, the so-called 'spin-
doctors', now hold a privileged and influential position.  This they do with little 
apparent accountability and despite a burgeoning public profile. 
 
Other Parties. 
The comparative poverty and small size of the other British parties has meant that 
the Conservatives and Labour are responsible for most of the major innovations in 
political communication.  There have, nevertheless, been times when the less funded 
and staffed organisations have made significant breakthroughs in campaign terms.  
During the 1929 general election the Liberals, for instance, broke with precedent 
when they began advertising in the press.  The following decade the party once again 
set a precedent by becoming the first to hire an advertising executive to manage its 
publicity campaigns.  The official in question, William Allison, joined Liberal 
headquarters direct from the leading agency J. Walter Thompson in 1937.62  More 
recently the party challenged conventional wisdom when, during the 1974 general 
elections, it took put advertising in national newspapers.  Following legislation, 
politicians had assumed this was an illegal act.  By their actions, the Liberals forced a 
change that led to the larger parties spending huge amounts on print advertising in 
the 1980s.  That decade saw the Liberals’ then allies in the newly formed Social 
Democrat Party experiment with professional direct marketing techniques.  Through 
the use of personalised mailshots the SDP was able to build its membership base 
and raise not insubstantial funds.  During the 1985 by-election in the huge rural seat 
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of Brecon and Radnor, the Liberal/SDP Alliance demonstrated its mastery of direct 
marketing and niche targeting in an ultimately successful campaign.63   
 
In recent years there has been a rise in minor party and independent parliamentary 
candidates.  Most rely on traditional grassroots’ work, the occasional Party Election 
Broadcast and new media forms to put across their message.  Others however have 
attempted to emulate the approach of the larger parties.  During its relatively 
successful European election campaign of 1989, the Greens employed advertising 
experts to help create a memorable Broadcast.  In the 1992 general election the 
Natural Law Party became, in spending terms, the fourth largest competitor when it 
funded a major if ineffectual print and outdoor advertising campaign.  During the 
subsequent campaign of 1997 the Referendum Party led by the billionaire 
businessman Sir James Goldsmith outspent all but the two largest parties.  Before its 
demise the Referendum organisation brought one notable innovation to British 
politics: the campaign video, copies of which were sent to millions of householders. 
 
 
Conclusions. 
Three key stages in the development and transformation of British political 
communication have been identified.  In discussing what have been termed the mass 
propaganda, media campaigning and political marketing the emphasis has been on 
the changing relationship between the party and electorate rather than any media or 
technological innovations.  The growing use of market research as a feedback 
mechanism is central to understanding how political communication has developed 
over the course of the Century.  That said there is sometimes a tendency on the part 
of the politicians and media to inflate their own importance as innovators or actors.  
Consequently it is important to recognise that while there have been major changes 
in the way campaigns are now conducted, there are some significant continuities in 
practice and theorising.  Visual media such as film and posters began to play an 
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influential electoral role during the inter-war period.  In the same era, strategists 
started to talk about the importance of ‘image’, advertising and the psychology of the 
electorate.  Interest in these and other phenomena intensified following the Second 
World War with the arrival of the so-called ‘consumer society’.  More recently the 
terms ‘image maker’ and ‘spin doctor’, both obvious manifestations of a managerial 
approach, have come to dominate modern political discourse.  Arguably the 1992 
general election was something of an electoral watershed because both major parties 
subscribed to a marketing driven strategy.   
 
Political communication, most obviously in the form of campaigning, is concerned 
with more than just electioneering.  It forms the civic link between the people and 
their representatives.  Marketing and media methods have transformed the 
relationship in various ways.  Most crucially the views of key sections of 
uncommitted voters, as determined by public and private opinion polling research, 
now play an influential role in the respective parties’ preparation for a campaign.  
Furthermore effective political communication is not only about persuading the 
mass of public opinion but also seeks to mobilise and manage dissent inside the 
organisation.  The increased mediation and marketisation of politics has further 
centralised power within leaderships to the detriment of rivals within the party.  
Indeed this change, rather than any improvement in voter persuasion, maybe the 
most significant outcome of the increased professionalisation of political 
communication. 
 
The trend towards the centralisation of power within party leaderships can be seen 
in a variety of ways.  With ‘New’ Labour there has been a downgrading of the party's 
traditional federal structures, most obviously the Annual Conference and its 
National Executive Committee.  The rise of new policy fora in place of conference 
or executive debates has enabled the leadership to effectively manage discussion and 
outcomes.  It seems highly likelihood that the General Secretary, the party's chief 
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executive, will ever again publicly criticise the parliamentary leadership in a way that 
happened during the 1970s.  The mass membership has become increasingly 
peripheral to discussions.  Their input into policy is highly marginal when compared 
with the influence wielded by New Labour’s advertising, market research and public 
relations consultants.  Similarly the Conservative leader William Hague has 
embarked on an ambitious programme of party organisational reform which draws 
on his own as a management consultant and the business acumen of his aides and 
advisors.  Even the Liberal Democrats, the most federal of the main national parties, 
is to a large extent guided by its new leader Charles Kennedy.  Kennedy's reported 
interest in developing a more consensual approach to the running of the party 
suggests an open-minded outlook but nevertheless reveals the residual powers now 
invested in his leadership. 
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